News

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We already reviewed the goal and main features of the social service “Domestic social patronage” (DSP), offered by the municipalities. The crisis and the state of emergency have demonstrated this service is an even more important tool in addressing the needs of the elderly and of citizens with special needs.

Following a thorough examination of the data received from the Agency of social assistance (ASA) and of all municipal budgets available for the last few years, we can now offer a more accurate depiction of DSP.

The Domestic social patronage has been acknowledged as one of the most comprehensive local level social services. It entails primarily food and medicine delivery, household services, special aid, social contact, etc. In recent years, DSP has provided support to nearly 40,000 people per annum. In 2019, it reached 37,943 people from around the country. The vacant places are 6,373, or 17% of the total capacity. Although in 33 municipalities the social service is not available, similar services are at place as a substitute.

The annual expenses of the social patronage amount to around 340 thousand leva on average per municipality, or 22 leva per person, according to data from the municipal budgets from 2019 and 2020. In the capital, the annual budget for DSP is close to 6 million leva (covering 1,658 people), in Varna – 3 million (550 people), in Burgas – 2 million (850 people), while in Plovdiv – 1 million leva for the 400 people covered.

There are notable distinctions among the different districts and municipalities which provide the service. Social patronage covers over 1000 per 100 thousand people of the population in the districts of Dobrich, Montana, Pleven and Razgrad. Conversely, in the districts of Smolyan, Kardjali and the capital, under 300 per 100,000 people from the pertinent population receive the aid. The proportion of people included as a share of those over 65, the main target group of DSP, reveals a similar picture. In the districts of Montana, Pleven and Razgrad around 50 out of every 1000 people over 65 are included in DSP, while in Smolyan and the Capital they hardly number 10.

The Domestic social patronage is particularly important for the everyday arrangements of people in need (mostly the elderly), but also limits social isolation, and is often better and cheaper alternative to their institutionalization.

The government awarded more than 250 million leva for “valuable municipal projects” in its last session. What is paradoxical about this decision is that the sum in question is greater than the common targeted subsidy for municipal capital expenditure in the budget for 2021. A single session of the government proved more important for local investments than the entire procedure of adopting the budget. Municipal investment, already dependent on state transfers, is growing increasingly reliant on manual control from the Council of Ministers as well.

It is not clear why the government should be concerned with the adoption of every single local investment. Be it a new park in Haskovo, a street renovation in Simitli, the building of a sport site in Aitos or landscaping of the city square in Elena – all of this apparently requires the ministers to get together on the 9^th of December, 2020 and give the green light. Is this is the optimal model for regional development? Not local self-governance, but a model imposed by the supreme administrator.

This entire resource for local investment, voted in “by emergency”, accounts for under 1% of tax revenue. In other words, if even a tenth of the 10% income tax actually remained on the local level, municipalities would have the funds to make these investments without having to wait for ministerial authorization. What is more, private funds allow much smarter management and long-term planning. The endless “asphalt” investments are to a certain extent the result of the December provisions model.

This is not to say that the knowledge economy, which we aspire to, does not require asphalt and basic infrastructure. What is clear, however, is the contrast between claims for “smart” investments – indicated in the Plan for the restoration and sustainability of the projects set out in the municipal program for the period 2021-2027, and the reality of the December provision, which has few if any tangencies with the transformation of the national economy. In this case, extremely centralized regional planning does not lead to intelligent decisions. Quite the opposite – the competition becomes to appropriate some money, and throw it at the painfully familiar “asphalt” investments.

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Just before the pandemic broke out, we focused on the development of Plovdiv and Varna as the two strongest economic centers in the country after the capital. In recent years, the contest for the title “second most populous Bulgarian city” has emerged as an interesting highlight of their comparative development. In view of the forthcoming census in 2021, and the ongoing socio-economic processes in Plovdiv and Varna, we can shed some light on the dispute.

In the first place, it is important to note that we focus on the city in particular, rather than on the population of the district or municipality. For this purpose, we have used census data from the National Institute of Statistics (NIS), and ongoing observations for the last 10 years. We have not used data from the Head Directorate of Civil Registration and Administrative Service (CRAS) for permanent and current addresses. Despite this being a viable alternative, we chose the longer-term historical order, based on censuses, as our foundation. Population data, however, does not account for the tourist flow, which would be a substantial boost for Varna in the summer season.

The national common sense contends that Plovdiv is the second largest city in Bulgaria. Successive censuses throughout the years verify this claim. For most of the 20^th century, both cities steadily increased their population. Plovdiv maintained its lead, while the greatest difference in the censuses is from 1946, when it almost totals 50 thousand citizens – 123 thousand in Plovdiv versus 77,000 in Varna. The last census from the communist period (conducted 1985) documented incredible development in both cities, all the while the absolute numerical difference remained similar – 342 thousand in Plovdiv compared to 302 thousand in Varna. The transition generated diverging dynamics for both cities.

After the changes, Plovdiv’s population ‘froze’, while Varna’s continued growing. In reality, Varna is probably the only other city apart from Sofia, which has invariably augmented its population in every next census for more than 100 years. Censuses from 1985, 1992, 2001 and 2011 attribute a population of 338-342 thousand to Plovdiv (338 thousand in 2011). At the same time, Varna gradually expanded its population from 302 thousand in 1985 to 334 in 2011. Thus in the last census the difference between the two cities barely reached 3,283 people.

Following the logic of the recent censuses, Varna is projected to overtake Plovdiv in population in the 2021 census. Yet this remains uncertain. The last 10 years have changed the socio-economic trajectory of certain regions, and one of the most explicit changes is the success of Plovdiv. The city ‘under the hills’ managed to restart its growth, and resumed attracting population. This is evident from the economic processes, such as the development of manufacturing in Plovdiv’s periphery, and from the newly opened vacancies in the digital sector. Pro-cultural tendencies also contributed – the emergence and successful development of “Kapana” as the quarter of creative industries, for instance. Plovdiv has always been a strong cultural and manufacturing center, but the last decade’s unambiguously upturning dynamics has “overturned” the city’s demographics.

In the meanwhile, Varna, is not in a position to change the trajectory of its demographics, which is either way supported by the continuous influx of young people, attracted by the “summer capital” of the marine capital and the six universities it houses. Similar to Plovdiv, Varna’s uptake was also supported by a strong manufacturing in the wider periphery of the city, growth in the digital sector, and developments in the cultural sphere.

But how big exactly is the growth of the last 10 years?

Current NIS population data indicate a relatively modest growth in Varna, and a more substantial growth in Plovdiv in the last decade. Hence the expectation Plovdiv will keep its second place. The issue here is, that two consecutive censuses (from 2001 and 2011) reveal, that the pertinent NIS data underestimates Varna’s population and overestimates that of Plovdiv. For instance, in the period 2001-2011, NIS recorded an annual increase in Plovdiv’s population, although the eventual census showed it had slightly shrank compared to 2001.

Everything said so far proves that the contest for the second city is not decided. Varna demonstrates better long-term trends in the last 30 years, but Plovdiv has marked a restart in the last 10, and is also striving ahead. Both cities featured distinguishably good years prior to the pandemic, and are profiting from the dynamics of the digital sector in Bulgaria as well. The effect of the pandemic can play a critical role in this competition – a strong hit on tourism is accompanied with prospective stimulus for migration of citizens employed in the digital sector. On a broader regional scope, however, the rivalry of the two cities is healthy, as it takes away the excessive focus from the capital, and provides alternatives for regional development in the country.

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